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Abstract
Over the past several years the residential home building industry has experienced a
worsening liquidity crisis for acquisition, development and construction capital. This
thesis examines the current state of capital availability, and the prospects for new sources
of capital, namely in the form of pension fund investment.
The first part of this thesis evaluates the current availability of capital. This is
accomplished by examining the current lending practices of the traditional sources of
capital. The reduction in funds available for acquisition, development and construction
lending will be quantified and the causes of the decline in capital will be examined.
Next it is established that while capital funding to the industry has declined, demand for
housing has remained stable. The logical conclusion to be drawn is that there is a need for
new sources of capital for the housing industry in order to meet the demand for new
homes.
While several alternative sources of capital are currently being explored by the industry,
the source that appears closest to being tapped is the vast pool of capital held by pension
funds. This thesis will demonstrate how investments in single family housing can be
structured to meet the pension fund's needs while minimizing risk through an analysis of
the CalPERS investment currently being developed in California.
Thesis Supervisor: Thomas Steele
Chairman
Center for Real Estate
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SECTION I
THE NEED FOR CAPITAL
CHAPTER I
THE CREDIT CRUNCH
Over the past several years a disturbing trend has been developing in the single family
housing construction and development industry. Acquisition, development and
construction (AD&C) financing has become increasingly difficult for many builders to
obtain. The result of this trend could be the reshaping of the building industry as we know
it today. The medium sized builder (25 to 250 homes a year) is slowly getting squeezed
out of existence. This could adversely impact the ability of the industry to play its
traditional role of leading the economy out of a recession, since it is these builders who
construct the bulk of the one million plus homes completed each year. At the peak of
single family construction activity in 86-87, $55 billion was outstanding in construction
loans by eleven major lender groups 1 . Another $55 billion was outstanding in land loans
(see exhibit 1). By the third quarter of 1991 these figures were reduced to $33 billion and
$31 billion respectively, for a total reduction in AD&C capital of $33.5 billion.
ISurvey of Mortgage Lender Activity, 1970 - 1991, Department of Housing and Urban Development
Exhibit 1
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
The difficulty in obtaining AD&C financing in today's environment is a little disputed fact.
Numerous articles and interviews have been published on this subject. In some instances
the illiquidity in the market is rightfully deserved. Some regions have experienced lack of
demand due to overbuilding and/or regional economic considerations such as
unemployment. In some areas land speculation has driven lot prices too high to warrant
development. Yet in other situations builders are finding that they cannot finance pre-sold
homes. Institutions that have been serving these builders for a dozen years are turning
them away. The reasons for this are several. The most apparent cause of illiquidity is the
recent downturn in the real estate market. Overbuilt office and retail space has driven
commercial real estate values down. Those bankers and institutional lenders that have so
far survived have become deservedly reluctant to make any kind of real estate loan.
Residential real estate has not been immune. Of the eleven major lender groups tracked by
H.U.D., all, with the exception of state and local credit agencies, have shown a decline in
lending for single family AD&C loans (see table 1).
AD&C Lending for Eleven Major Lending Groups
(millions of dollars)
Mutual Savings Life Non- Ins. Private St. & L. Federal St. & L.
Comm. Savings & Loan Insur. Pension Mort. MBS Retire. Credit Mort. Credit
Banks Banks Assoc. Co.'s Funds Co.'s Cond. Funds Agc. Pools Agc.
1983 20154 766 27955 267 119 1751 0 42 0 0 46
1984 23617 811 41123 297 111 1885 0 24 0 0 32
1985 30553 1318 33478 662 7 8553 0 24 0 0 36
1986 42113 884 48119 1433 16 4395 0 10 0 0 49
1987 41831 2792 46895 661 8 3830 0 24 0 0 86
1988 48984 3387 45474 661 8 2199 0 21 0 0 37
1989 46817 3571 38770 619 8 1702 0 21 0 0 64
199C 50484 2039 26700 636 6 2129 0 1 0 0 93
1991 41314 1440 17822 658 5 2269 0 0 0 0 97
Table 1
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Beyond the psychological and economic impact that falling real estate values and
foreclosed loans have had, stepped up regulation has made real estate loans increasingly
difficult to make. Together with commercial banks, savings and loan associations have
accounted for 90% to 95% of all AD&C lending activity for single family residential
development. 2 From a 1986 peak of $27 billion, outstanding construction loans from S &
L's have fallen to $8.7 billion in the 3rd quarter of 1991 (see exhibit 2). Likewise,
outstanding land loans from S & L's have fallen from a 1987 peak of $27.8 billion to $9
billion in the 3rd quarter of 1991. According to NAHB chief economist David Seiders, S
& L's, which once made up nearly 50% of total AD&C lending, are now expected to
contribute only 20% when the dust settles in the lending arena. Much of this is due to the
21bid
impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA).
I
Exhibit 2
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
FIRREA has had a significant impact on the S & L's ability to remain active in AD&C
lending because it requires that thrifts hold no more than 65% of their lending portfolio in
real estate. Many S & L's, in order to meet this objective, have little choice but to stop
making real estate loans, period. Regulators are forcing these institutions to reevaluate
the performing loans that they have on their books. In many instances reappraised
property values have resulted in a current loan falling below certain specified loan to value
ratios, thus creating the non-performing performing loan. These loans are either called or
paid down, further draining the industry of scarce capital.
In addition, FIRREA mandates that S & L's achieve and maintain a certain level of
capitalization. From a historical level of about 5%, S & L's are required to achieve an 8%
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capitalization rate for 1992. This again has resulted in the curtailment of lending at many
institutions as they scramble to raise capital. In determining the capitalization rate
FIRREA has also set risk-weightings for the various types of assets. Residential AD&C
loans carry one of the highest risk-weightings, along with commercial real estate loans,
versus treasury bills which carry zero risk. With the current construction lending rate of
200 basis points over prime, institutions should be able to make more money investing in
government securities - which require zero capital reserves - than in housing production -
which is perceived as the most risky investment and requires the biggest reserves under
current rules.3
FIRREA has also limited the ability of an S & L to lend to any one borrower with its loans
to one borrower limits. No borrower may account for more than 15% of an institution's
unimpaired capital. Fewer than forty thrifts in the United States have the necessary capital
to make a $20 million loan to a single borrower.4 A $12 million AD&C loan would entail
an institution to have $1 billion in risk-adjusted assets. This has forced many of the
smaller and medium sized S & L's to withdraw funding from builders as well as to walk
away from economically sound projects. In a survey of over 1100 builders completed by
NAHB, the reason cited by 56% of the respondents for the change in thrift lending
practices was the limit on loans to one borrower rule. 5 Builders are being forced to line
up multiple lenders for single projects, further raising the odds that a project will not get
built.
Savings and Loans are not the only institutions that have curtailed their lending activities.
Commercial banks, which traditionally made up 45% of AD & C lending, are also limiting
3
"The 1992 Housing Forecast", Builder January 1992, Pg. 134
4
"The Changing Face of Equity Financing", Andrew Jubelt, The Real Estate Finance Journal Winter
1991
5AD&C Financing Survey, NAHB, May 1990
the amount of funds they have available. Total loans outstanding for single family home
construction has fallen from a 1990 peak of $29.8 billion to $21.5 billion in the 3rd quarter
of 1991. Total land loans from commercial banks decreased from a 1988 peak of $28.7
billion to a 3rd quarter of 1991 total of $19.8 billion (see exhibit 3). While this decrease is
not as pronounced as what is happening to S & L's, it is significant because commercial
banks are expected to fill the void left by the S & L's.
Exhibit 3
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Banks are feeling the same pressures that have been working against the S & L's. The
collapse of the real estate market, especially in the office and retail sectors, has made
bankers wary of any kind of real estate lending. Regulators are also applying pressure on
the banks to reduce their real estate portfolios and increase their capitalization rates. In
1990 the Office of Comptroller of the Currency issued an advisory for banks to reduce
their real estate portfolios. Rather than risk the disfavor of regulators, many banks took
the initiative to follow the advice. In December of 1990 new capital requirements were
issued for commercial banks, further reducing banks' willingness to lend. To compound
the problem the regulatory environment has yet to stabilize. Banking reform is a
continuing topic on Capital Hill. To date much of the regulatory guidelines are voluntary.
Statutory loan to value ratios and stricter capitalization rates are not inconceivable.
While AD&C loans from commercial banks, as well as S & L's, are still available, the
standards being applied to the loans are much stricter. Builders are being required to
adhere to a much tougher approval process. Banks are requiring extensive documentation
and financial reporting on not only the project in question, but on all of the builder's
portfolio. Banks want to see more equity in the deal on behalf of the builder. Debt
financing has fallen from an average of 95% of a project's cost to 70% of the cost.6 It is
not uncommon for this figure to go as low as 60%.7 The institutions want the builder to
demonstrate a solid source of liquidity should overruns be encountered. And the days of
non-recourse financing are long gone. Collateral is the key word today.
While there is no dispute that the flow of capital has significantly slowed to the housing
industry and that the capital that is available is harder to come by, there is some dispute as
to whether or not this constitutes a credit crunch. Edward McKelvey of Goldman Sachs
& Co. has pointed out that the two symptoms of a credit crunch - an increase in prices and
a shortage of new homes for sale - cannot be found. 8 One of NAHB's economists Dean
Crist has stated that what is working against new home sales is not lack of credit but
rather a weakness in demand. 9 As the economy struggles to come out of the recession,
6
"The Changing Face of Equity Financing", Andrew Jubelt, The Real Estate Finance Journal Winter
1991
7Comments from the Builders Financing Forum, San Francisco, CA, May 1992
8
"Washington Still Debates Whether There Really is a Credit Crunch", Professional Builder &
Remodeler, February 1992
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demand is destined to pick up. This will be examined in the next chapter. If a surge in
demand is met by a lack of supply and swiftly rising home prices, the momentum of such a
recovery could be severely thwarted. New sources of capital must be ready to step into
the void left by S & L's and commercial banks to assure that the funds will be available to
maintain the momentum. Now is the time for these sources to be developed.
CHAPTER II
HOUSING DEMAND
The traditional financial institutions that have been serving the home building industry
have dramatically tightened up their lending practices. 60% of the respondents to NAHB's
builder survey reported that their development or construction plans were altered because
of changes in institutional lending practices.1 0 The majority of those polled attributed this
to tougher regulators and loans to one borrower rules. Many of the builders commented
that they experienced lost sales, not to mention foregone projects, because of the
restrictions and delays encountered.
In terms of opportunities for new sources of financing to enter the market, importance is
placed not so much on the degree of difficulty in obtaining credit but rather on whether or
not the demand on the building industry to produce more units is unsatisfied. Stable
pricing would indicate that there is no excessive demand. This approach for evaluating the
need for capital can be misleading. First, the country is experiencing a sharp drop in the
value of land, thanks in part to the widespread speculation that drove prices artificially
high the last few years. Demand is holding new home prices stable as the value of the
underlying land is depreciating. Second, to produce a home can take two years or more
10 Acguisition, Development & Construction Financing Survey NAHB, May 1990
from initial development financing. Stable home prices today reflect the availability of
capital two years ago. Restricted capital today can result in inflated prices tomorrow. To
gauge the need for capital today by the price levels today would not take into account
future demand.
A closer examination of recent trends reveals that the housing industry is starting to turn
around. The first sign has been the stabilization and improvement of the sales rate for new
single family homes (see exhibit 4). The latest upward turn in sales reflects strong
performance at the end of 1991 and during the first months of 1992. It is safe to assume
that sales for 1992 will only slightly exceed those of 1991. The latest seasonally adjusted
numbers put out by the Bureau of Census support this conclusion. The outlook for the
Exhibit 4
SOURCE: HOME SALES, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS
housing industry is further strengthened by the continual contraction of inventory (see
exhibit 5). A recent survey of senior examiners and liquidators at federal banking agencies
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corroborates this trend. 11 The percentage of respondents reporting excess supply in the
housing markets has shrunk to 54% from an April, 1991 high of 69% when the survey was
started. Stabilized sales and continually declining inventories will eventually require an
increase in production.
Exhibit 5
SOURCE: HOME SALES, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS
An additional indication that the housing industry is trying to gear up its production is the
recent increase in permit activity. The number of permits authorized for the construction
of single family homes has slowly been rising throughout the latter half of 1991 and into
the first months of 1992.12 Permits have declined slightly through March and have
stabilized at a seasonally adjusted 875,000 units from April through June of 1992 (see
exhibit 6 and Table 2). Accompanying this trend is a prediction by NAHB that housing
IISurvey of Real Estate Trends, FDIC, May, 1992
12Federal Reserve Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank, Table 2.14
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starts should increase by 12% in 1992 and 14% in 1993.13 This prediction may prove
overly optimistic, as other economists such as Wheaton and DiPasquale are predicting
housing construction to remain flat through the turn of the century, rising in 1992 and then
falling slightly through 2000.14 As of June 1992, seasonally adjusted new starts are
showing a 20% increase over 1991 (see exhibit 7). These trends in starts, permits and
anticipated construction are occurring in the face of a 33% drop in AD&C lending
documented in the previous chapter. If builders are having problems financing new
projects as they claim, then it appears that they are supporting this construction activity
through inventoried supplies of raw land and lots. Again, the FDIC survey of bank
examiners supports this trend through the observation of declining supplies.
Exhibit 6
SOURCE: BUREAU OF CENSUS
13
"The Future of Homebuilding", Eric Belsky, Housing Economics January 1991
14
"Housing Market Dynamics and the Future of Housing Prices", Joint Center for Housing Studies;
Dennis DiPasquale, William Wheaton; Harvard University June 1992
Single Family Housing Permits (000's)
1990 1991 1992*1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Year
SINGLE FAMILY HOME STATISTICS
*Seasonally adjusted (000's)
1991 JAN 92* FEB 92* MAR 92* APR 92* MAY 92* JUN 92*
PERMITS 754 913 946 907 873 879 876
STARTS 840 989 1109 1068 933 1035 1010
INVENT. 283 281 269 276 275 274 N/A
Table 2
SOURCE: BUREAU OF CENSUS
Exhibit 7
SOURCE: BUREAU OF CENSUS
If the typical buildout on a single family project of 60 to 100 units is two to four years
from initial land acquisition, and even as long as 10 - 15 years on master planned
communities, then the industry has just started to feel the impact of the regulatory changes
initiated by FIRREA in 1989. It is conceivable that the affects of the credit crunch today
will not be felt for several more years (other than the fact that the building industry is
experiencing sharp reductions in employment). Should demand continue to grow as
described in the next paragraph, two years from now depleted inventories and otherwise
insufficient supply may sharply drive up the price of housing. This may have the unwanted
affect of killing off demand and thwarting the recovery. Likewise, additional investment
today will not result in excessive supplies today, but rather adequate supplies for next year
and beyond.
Whether or not demand is going to continue to grow is a key question. While the starter
home product is expected to lose market share to move up homes, largely due to the
shifting of the baby boom into the 35 - 45 age group and by the aging of the baby bust
generation, there will still remain a pent up demand for starter housing. 15 This will be
attributable to several trends. Households are forming later in life. There are an
increasing number of single person and divorced households. The flattening of housing
prices has given income levels a chance to catch up; homes are finally becoming
affordable, especially as a greater number of dual income families are forming. As William
Apgar and George Masnick point out, as incomes rise, housing appreciation slows, and
mortgage rates decline, the affordability gap slowly begins to close. This will also give
rise to an increased demand for second homes. Households that have been putting off the
decision to purchase second homes are now seeing these homes become more affordable.
If demand continues to grow there will be increasing pressure on the industry to replace
the dwindling stock of units and lots in the next few years. This will create an opportunity
and need for additional capital in the market place. It is doubtful that thrifts will have
recovered in time to satisfy this need. It is also doubtful that commercial banks will be
15
"Some Simple Facts About the Demand For New Residential Construction in the 1990's", William
Apgar, George Masnick, The Journal of Real Estate Research Vol. 6, No. 3
able or willing to provide all of the needed capital, especially as it is likely that the
commercial real estate problems will not have fully abated. Alternative sources of capital
are needed to fill in. By entering the market now, when there is a growing demand for
funds and little competition to provide them, these alternative sources will be able to
establish for themselves a long term position in funding the home building industry
SECTION II
ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL SOURCES
CHAPTER III
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF CAPI AL
In the last few years builders and industry finance experts have been looking beyond
commercial banks and savings and loans to finance merchant home building activities.
This search has centered on equity gap financing. This gap is made up of the difference in
the 95% of a project's cost that was traditionally funded and the 50% to 60% of a project's
cost still available from financial institutions today. The equity requirement for a project
has grown from 5% to 40% or 50%. In other words, banks and S & L's are asking
builders to increase the level of equity in a project by upwards of 800% to 1000%.
The search for equity has involved wealthy individuals, corporations, syndications,
institutions, venture capitalists, and Wall Street, amongst others. This chapter will explore
some of these sources and touch briefly on their ability to impact the industry.
The Traditional Approach
Some builders have taken the traditional approach to raising capital by forming
partnerships with high net worth individuals or corporations. This has proved suitable
mainly to small builders and large builders. Smaller builders, who build around 25 units
per year or less, have successfully been able to link up with high net worth individuals to
finance their operations. There are two main characteristics to such an arrangement; the
dollar volume is not substantial, usually less than a million, and the builder's operation is
small enough so that the financial partner can easily monitor the deal and understand the
operation. There are also greater opportunities for the smaller builders to involve a land
owner or client in the deal. Such arrangements are usually on a deal by deal basis.
The larger builder, on the other hand, can use its size to pursue capital directly from
corporations or institutions, or even the public market. These builders can operate from
direct debt placements in the public market or line of credits from consortiums of banks or
firms such as GE Capital. They also have the ability to issue stock because of their size.
Such builders are able to obtain capital through the strength of their operations as opposed
to the characteristics of a particular deal.
The medium size builder has a limited ability to directly pursue capital from these sources.
Usually their operations are too large for any one particular investor to finance. Rarely
will a medium size builder try to directly approach several investors for a deal; more often
than not there is some sort of middleman involved in such an effort. The public market
and large corporate investors are also difficult for mid-sized builders to approach directly.
The builders usually do not have the size to interest the corporate investor or the public
placement investment bankers.
Venture capitalists have been active in the development industry for some time. Investors
such as Jackson Street Partners of San Francisco tend to target the sector of the housing
industry that offers returns in the neighborhood of 35 to 50%, namely land development
and the entitlement process. Because of the higher risk involved in this sector of the
industry, venture capital carries with it a higher cost. These funds also require the
developer partner to have 20 to 25% equity in the deal. While these funds are available,
they generally are not attractive to most builders because of the cost and equity
requirements.
Similar to venture capital are syndications. After a steep decline in popularity due to loss
of tax-incentives from the Tax Refe-n Act of 1986, syndications are starting to make a
come back. 16 The difference now is that these deals are economically driven. In order to
make these deals attractive to investors, the returns must be in the 35 to 50% range.
Again, this involves investing in the land development process. Syndicators like Alda
Properties of San Francisco will sell off their position, retaining a syndication and
management fee.
One other source that has been mentioned from time to time are foreign investors.
Unfortunately, these investors were burned badly from the recent devaluation of
commercial real estate. Rockefellar Center and Pebble Beach are two of the more
notorious examples. Japanese investment in U.S. real estate is off 25% between 1988 and
1990.17 The recent decline of off-shore stock markets has also tightened the availability of
foreign capital. If investment is to come from abroad, the most likely sources will be
Hong Kong and Germany. So far, the capital flight out of Hong Kong has mainly headed
towards other former British colonies (besides the U.S.) such as Canada and Australia and
industrializing Asian nations. Some of this capital is finding its way to the West Coast.
To attract this capital will require the development of relations with individual investors. 18
This will serve to greatly limit the impact of such investment. Germany is also a potential
source. The dollar has recently approached its post-WW II low against the mark.19 This
16"The Changing Face of Equity Finance", Andrew Jubelt, The Real Estate Finance Journal, Winter 1991
17
"The Capital Crunch and Financial Restructurings", Real Estate Finance Spring 1991
18Comments from Joe McGhie, Resource Capital Group, Inc., Builders Financing Forum, San Francisco,
Ca., May 22, 1992
19U.S., Europe Join to Boost Weak Dollar, Wall Street Journal July 21, 1992 pg. cI
should serve to attract German investment to the U.S. The problem with German, and
European capital, is that much of it is headed towards opportunities in Eastern Europe and
opportunities created by the relaxed trade barriers throughout Western Europe.
The Alternative Approach
The most likely sources of new capital for mid-sized builders are going to be through
various kinds of equity funds that raise capital through individual and corporate investors.
Some firms are raising money internally to take advantage of the opportunities available in
housing. In the case of Westcor in Arizona, Westcor has raised capital internally to
perpetuate their own land development activities. Westcor is investing in large tracts of
land, obtaining entitlements, and installing the backbone infrastructure. Large parcels, or
"superpads" are then sold to builders. Recognizing the shortage of capital in the market,
Westcor is structuring a lot of the deals so that the builders do not have to buy the land
outright. Westcor will go as far as completing the on-site infrastructure, if the deal is
secure enough. The builder's search for capital is then limited to the construction
financing. The builder is thus able to build a project otherwise unobtainable from lack of
acquisition financing, while Westcor is able to continue to develop land. Deals like these
present some excellent opportunities for builders, but because of the scarcity of firms like
Westcor, the volume of such deals will have a minimal impact on the credit problem.
Recently, Wall Street has been trying to take advantage of the credit crunch as well. A
prime example is the creation of Pacific Greystone Homes, Inc. 20 This venture firm was
created through the acquisition of eight existing projects in California with a $65 million
investment by E.M. Warburg, Pinkus & Co., Inc. The management hopes to take the new
firm public when the annual output reaches 1500 units. The impact of such deals will be
20Real Estate Week, A Crittenden Publication, June 1992
very limited. Another example of Wall Street stepping up to the plate is a program being
developed by Goldman Sachs & Company. Goldman is targeting those metropolitan areas
that have demonstrated significant demand but are lacking in credit facilities. They are
investing equity for their own account in a program that targets the land development and
entitlement side of the building process. They intend to invest 30 to 40% of the equity in a
deal, attracting lenders for the remainder. Lots would then be sold off to builders with
construction loans coming from Goldman Mortgage Corporation. The construction loans
would in effect be serving as a take out facility for the development lender.
While these and similar efforts on Wall Street can only help to ease the credit crunch,
many builders are waiting and hoping for a program to be developed that can tap the retail
investor market. According to one source on Wall Street who requested anonymity,
several problems need to be resolved first. Namely, investors are skeptical of real estate
and funds. Such a program would be management intensive, involving deals of relatively
small magnitude - $4 to $5 million - and unattractive returns; "The margins on home-
building are too small given the alternative uses of capital." Establishing the credibility of
those tapping into such a program was also noted as a problem that would have to be
overcome. These problems are more symptoms of unfamiliarity with home building as an
investment than structural flaws in the Wall Street apparatus. Once returns and risks from
home building are better understood, possibly through the experience of pension fund
investment, Wall Street should become more active. Wall Street appears to have
recognized the opportunities that are becoming available in the home building industry. It
is only a matter of time before a suitable instrument is created to take advantage of the
opportunities opening up from the contraction of the traditional lending sources. If there
is money to be made, and there is, Wall Street will be a player.
Much of the problems with venture capitalists, syndicators, and Wall Street lay with the
need for high returns that can only be obtained in the home building industry through the
development and entitlement process. Pension funds on the other hand are a
fundamentally different animal. They seek low risk investments and are willing to accept
lower returns in exchange. Their willingness to accept lower returns, 8% real rate of
return annually, longer payback durations, four to thirty years, and the amount of their
discretionary capital available for investment makes pension funds an attractive target for
investment advisors and the building industry. Stephen Roulac has estimated that pension
funds, as of the end of 1991, have $118.9 billion, or 5% of their $2.3 trillion in assets, in
real estate.2 1 As Michael Herzeberg noted in a recent issue of National Real Estate
Investor, pension funds will need to place more dollars into real estate as they grow
because of diversification requirements. In addition, if the much talked about allocation of
funds target of 10% of assets into real estate is to be achieved, another $110 billion will
have to be invested in real estate, growth of funds aside. As evidenced by these facts,
pension funds could be a prime source for capital for the building industry. The question
as to whether or not home building is a suitable investment for pension funds will be
addressed in subsequent chapters.
Government and The Public Sector
One last source of capital that should be mentioned is the public sector. In the area of
affordable housing several agencies have been developed to help builders finance their
activities. One of the most prevalent is State Housing Finance Agencies. These agencies
are designed to provide below market financing for builders constructing affordable
housing mostly in in-fill sites. Ben Golvin of Bridge Housing in San Francisco has recently
2 1
"Dimensions of the Restructuring in Real Estate Capital Markets", Real Estate Finance Journal Spring
1992
stated that upwards of $700 million is available in the State of California for affordable
housing.22 While many states have developed similar finance agencies, these programs
are often subject to the fiscal health of the state itself In an era of tightening budgets,
often these programs suffer.
Another example of public sector financing comes from California in the form of the
Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act. This piece of legislation has been enacted to try
and shift the burden of infrastructure construction from the developer to the end-user in
the form of a tax assessment. 23 Other programs along this line are tax increment
financing, which targets incremental tax revenues generated by improved property with
higher assessments for financing improvements, the creation of special assessment
districts, and the issuance of general obligation bonds. While these programs may offer
some relief to tight credit problems, their impact on the home building industry will be
limited.
Unfortunately, with the possible exception of Mello-Roos financing, public sector
programs do not hold a lot of promise for relieving the credit crunch facing mid-sized
builders of market rate homes. A program worth mentioning, not because of the amount
of capital it has brought into home building, but because of its potential to securitize
construction loans, is one created recently by the Federal National Mortgage Association.
This program is a direct attempt to provide relief to borrowers and lenders from the loans-
to-one-borrower rule. Small institutional lenders have become attracted to the program as
a means to extend their lending capacities. In the first deal consummated, Fannie Mae
bought a 50% participation in a financing package for a 78 unit single family project. 24
22Conunents at The Pacific Coast Builders Conference, San Francisco, CA., May 1992
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"Infrastructure Financing: Mello-Roos Financing in California", A. Darragh, C. Reyes, M. Williams,
The Real Estate Finance Journal, Spring 1992
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"Fannie Participates in Its First AD&C Loan", Brad German, Builder Feb 1992
Without Fannie Mae's participation the lender would not have been able to make the entire
loan. To date, six loan participations have been approved, representing a $20 million
investment by Fannie Mae.2  So far, the program has targeted only construction loans,
secured by the full value of the underlying property and improvements. Given this focus,
the impact of the program on the equity gap will be slight. The success of this $50 million
pilot program with a $6 million loan cap is being challenged by the difficulties in
understanding the complexities of AD&C lending, standardizing documentation, and
bringing builders and lenders together. Though this program is very promising, it may be
some time before the volume is such to really make an impact on the credit crunch.
There has also been some speculation that the RTC may be able to use its resources to
provide acquisition financing. In selling residential land from its portfolio, the RTC may
use seller financing to facilitate the liquidation process. At the time of this writing the
RTC had just started to deal with its land portfolio, so the extent of this practice for the
types of properties home builders would be interested in is unknown. Two assumptions
can safely be made at this time; one, that only the most financially secure builders would
be attributed this feature in buying land, and two, it may prove politically difficult to
subordinate this seller financing to senior construction loans. For the immediate future
then, the most promising source of relief appears to be the pension funds and the
investment programs being set up by their advisors.
25Tom Wilson, Federal National Mortgage Agency
SECTION III
PENSION FUNDS
CHAPTER IV
INVESTMENT IN HOME BUILDING
Investment Goals
Before making an argument for the investment of pension funds in the home building
industry, a review of investment goals is in order. Pension funds have a very defined
purpose - to provide a secure source of income for their members upon retirement.
Pension funds are not in the business of making high risk ventures to earn high returns.
They can be seen as having two primary goals; 1) preserve capital, and 2) hedge inflation.
In essence, this entails earning a real rate of return that covers the cost of operating the
fund, assuming that contributions are sufficient to fully fund the fund. Any additional
return serves only to benefit the sponsor by reducing its level of contributions. (While one
can argue that in the real world the beneficiaries have a stake in the strength and financial
health of the sponsor, theoretically the pension fund serves only the beneficiaries, and not
the sponsoring entity. Any further argument is not within the scope of this paper.)26 Thus
there is no need for a properly run fund to take excessive risks to earn higher than
26
"[Fiduciaries] must act solely in the interest of the plan participants and benficiaries for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits and defraying administrative costs;" Lisa Stover, ERISA and Fiduciary
Responsibility: Its Impact on Pension Fund Management, M.I.T. Sloan Schol of Management, 1986
moderate rates of return. It should also be pointed out that it is possible that tax-exempt
income earned by pension funds that is deemed excessive by the IRS can be reclassified as
UBTI and taxed accordingly. Over the course of several phone interviews with fund
managers, it is apparent that funds target real rates of return in the range of 5% to 8%. A
recent survey of 52 funds with $36 billion in equity real estate investments, or roughly
33% of the total pension fund allocation to real estate equity, found that fund managers on
average target 6% real returns. 27 According to Rodger Smith of Greenwich Associates,
funds can expect real estate to return an average annual rate of 6.6% between 1991 and
1996.28
Traditional Investment
Traditional pension fund investment in real estate has been driven by the desire to
minimize portfolio risk through diversification while hedging inflation . In the PREA
survey the respondents reported that the most important object of making real estate
investments was to take advantage of the negative correlation to stock market returns.
Inflation hedging and superior returns were also given as reasons. Surprisingly, the long
duration of real estate investments was not ranked as highly in importance.
Funds have made use of several investment vehicles; commingled funds account for
approximately 57% of real estate assets; separate direct investment accounts constitute
43% of real estate assets.29 In the PREA survey, total real estate assets included 70% in
equities, 10% in hybrid debt, and 14% in mortgages. Outside managers are used for
approximately 70% of the investments, 56% of which are on a non-discretionary basis.30
27"1991 Survey of Pension Sponsors", Mark Louargand, Pension Real Estate Association (PREA)
28
"Real Estate May Drop 15% More", Steve Hemmerick, Pension & Investments APRIL 27, 1992
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30"1991 Survey of Pension Sponsors", Mark Louargand, Pension Real Estate Association
Recently a trend has started to develop in how sponsors are allocating funds for
investments. The downturn in the real estate market, and thus the poor performance of
commingled funds, have caused sponsors to become wary of giving up control of their
investments. Commingled funds have experienced a steady decline in returns over the last
four years (see exhibit 8). Much of this is due to the decline in value of the properties held
by the funds. A property may return 6% in income but depreciate in value 20% for a net
loss of 14%.
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Sponsors are starting to turn away from commingled funds in favor of separate accounts.
Should a sponsor need to liquidate a position in a commingled account, and it entails
selling a property in a down market, other participants may not be amenable. Managers of
the funds may resist a participant's withdrawal so as to avoid having to realize a loss. A
case in point is when Tacoma Employees Retirement System tried to withdraw $15 million
from an open-ended fund run by Sentinel Real Estate Corporation. Eighteen months later,
1988 1989 1990 1991
Tacoma got its money.31 If a sponsor is not pleased with the management of the fund it
may be difficult to get enough of the participants together to make a change. This desire
to tighten control over funds is evident from the PREA survey. 96% of the dollars
targeted for investment this year are intended for separate accounts.
Characteristics of Housing Investment
Investment in residential home building offers pension funds an opportunity to further
diversify their real estate portfolios. The form that such an investment necessarily has to
take offers sponsors a very flexible device. Home building is a fractionalized business. Of
the 836,000 single family homes completed in 1991, the Builder Top 100 were responsible
for only 10%. The bulk of the industry is made up of builders completing from 25 to 250
units per year. Such investments then are going to be in relatively small increments, on a
project by project basis. While funds may balk at trying to pursue these management
intensive investments in-house, a specialized industry is starting to spring up to manage
these investments for the sponsors. The fractionalized nature of the industry and the
growth of specialty advisors allows sponsors to allocate sizable amounts of funds while at
the same time being able to increase or decrease their investments without having to
liquidate the account, whether it is a separate account or a commingled account. Equally
important, housing investments of $5 to $10 million allow smaller pension funds to invest
in equity real estate without having to go through a commingled fund. Given the recent
move away from commingled accounts, many funds should find these attractive features.
Real estate investments have been socked for losses over the last several years. Pension
fund real estate equity portfolios have been estimated to have lost 10% to 15% of initial
31" 1991 Real Estate Returns Plunge to Record Lows", Steve Hemmerick, Pension & Investment, Feb. 17,
1992
investments. 32 These losses are due to the depreciation in value of the underlying
properties stemming mainly from oversupply. Housing investment can avoid this sort of
loss. Potential losses are minimized immediately by spreading an investment allocation
amongst projects and builders. In addition, project phasing allows for investment to
coincide with the market. If the market turns down, subsequent phases can be delayed or
reevaluated for their investment potential, thus limiting the downside. If markets grow,
investors are in a position to take advantage of the demand. A relatively brief building
period and better approaches to controlling land for development have led to this
flexibility. Purchase options and lot take-downs are becoming more prevalent as land
owners are having trouble finding builders with the capital to purchase land outright. The
builder and the investor are thus able to limit their exposure to devaluation and
oversupply. The pre-selling of homes further allows the investor to limit its risk to
depreciation. And once the property is sold the investment is not subject to a lease market
or capitalized values based on a declining income stream. A good indicator of the relative
riskiness of housing construction and commercial construction is the default rate on
construction loans reported by the Office of Thrift Supervision; commercial construction
loans experienced a 7% default rate versus 1% for residential. 33
Diversification is also a key characteristic of housing investment that serves to mitigate
risk. The relatively small nature of investments allows sponsors to diversify within a
particular account. This can be accomplished by spreading funds to several different
builders. Losses suffered by one will not impact another. Funds can also be dispersed
geographically. They can be channeled into one market if it is hot or out of a market if it
is cold or they can be spread out to minimize a sudden downturn in any one particular
32"1991 Real Estate Returns Plunge to Record Lows", Hemmerick, Steve, Pension & Investments Feb.
17, 1992
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"Single Family Housing: An Institutional Investment Opportunity", Rapoport, Alice; Barbato, Jean;
Middlemarch Advisors, Inc./Continental Bank, N.A., 1992
market. With housing, investors can take advantage of the regional nature of the real
estate industry. Another way for sponsors to diversify is by product type. They can invest
in a product with higher margins but lower turnover rates such as luxury homes, or they
can invest in the lower margins and quicker turnovers of the first time buyer market.
Allocation between types can be adjusted to market demand. A fourth method of
diversification is through the vertical nature of the building process. Investment can be
made at the riskier end in the entitlement and zoning process of tracts of land, in the
moderately risky infrastructure development phase, or in the least risky subdivision
development and build out phase.
There are also a variety of investment vehicles available to pension funds. Several
commingled funds specializing in residential AD&C financing exist and more are being
created. The California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) has just created
the first separate account investment program utilizing five separate advisors. The form
that an investment takes can vary depending on the level of risk and expected returns. At
the lower end of the risk-return scale is straight senior debt. Because the investment is
secured by the value of the project and liability is limited because of a lender status,
returns are only comparable to traditional AD&C lending rates of prime plus 200 basis
points. At the other end of the scale is the traditional joint venture partnership where the
pension fund takes the direct position of financial partner. Such an investment can earn
returns in the neighborhood of 50% to 60% with all of the accompanying liability. The
most attractive investment forms are going to be participatory debt and joint venture gap
equity financing. These forms serve to mitigate the most risk while at the same time
provide an acceptable rate of return for pension funds. A closer examination of these
vehicles will be made in the following chapter.
Investment Returns
Returns from an investment in home building are derived from the amount for which a
house is sold less the cost to build the house. Simple, yet no other pension fund real estate
investment is similar. Housing is a manufactured durable good. The ability to earn a
return is dependent on a builder's ability to build a house for less than it can be sold for.
Once a unit is sold, a gain (or loss) is realized. Returns to home building are not
dependent on the gain or loss in value of the property over time, at least not to the extent
of a commercial real estate investment. The time involved can be as short as the six
months it takes to build a house. Because of this fact, the volatility of returns is
significantly less than that of other types of real estate investments, and other types of
asset classes, including stocks and bonds. In addition actual rates of return appear to be
higher than the 6.6% expected on real estate assets over the next four years.
Very little data exists that actually quantifies volatility and the return on investments in
home building, due in large part to the fractionalization of the industry and the relatively
few public companies from which to derive information. Two recent studies, though, have
attempted to determine rates of return and volatility of returns for investments in the least
risky, or subdivision build-out phase, of the home building process. The first was
completed by Hearthstone Advisors of San Francisco in 1992. By looking at data from
four publicly owned builders representing 344,000 homes built over 21 years, they found
that the weighted average mean annual rate of return on an unleveraged basis was 21.2%
with a standard deviation of 7.7%. A similar study was made by Alice Rapoport and Jean
Barbato of Middlemarch Advisors, Inc./Continental Bank, N.A. Their study involved five
publicly traded builders representing 200,000 homes built over the ten years ending
December 31, 1991. They found a nominal annual rate of return on an unleveraged basis
of 15.9%, a real rate of return of 12% and a standard deviation of 3.7%. This volatility
compared favorably with the Russell-NCREIF index (12.6%), the S&P 500 (11.5%), and
corporate bonds (12.3%).34 A study completed by Kenneth Leventhal & Company of
thirty private builders in California reported that the builders targeted on average an
internal rate of return of 29.5% over the period 1985 to 199035.
A study completed by Rogers, Casey36 found that of 14 open-end real estate funds, the
median annual rate of return was 8% over the last ten years. For 25 closed-end funds the
median annual rate of return was 6.2% over the last seven years. According to the
Russell-NCREIF Total Property Index annualized returns on real estate have averaged
6.19% over the last ten years. Retail property, which is the best performing property type
in this index has annualized returns of only 9.74% during the same time period. 37 Since
the returns on home building compare favorably to other real estate investments, the real~
question is whether or not investing in home building can be structured and managed well
enough to make it worthwhile. The next chapter looks at issues that need to be taken into
account when structuring an investment, followed by an examination of the CalPERS
investment program.
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CHAPTER V
STRUCTURING AN INVESTMENT
It is not sufficient to just look at potential returns and risk characteristics of pension
investment in home building in order to make a determination as to the merits of such an
investment. There are specific issues that must be addressed before an informed decision
can be made. Three important issues are, 1) how can an investment be structured to
insulate a pension fund from management risk, 2) since home building is a self-liquidating
process, how can the investment be managed to minimize reinvestment problems, and 3)
how can the investment be structured to avoid having the income classified as unrelated
business taxable income. 38
The management issue is an important question because this type of investment is
management intensive. An investment of $100 million can easily be split into twenty
separate projects, if not more. A quick back of the envelope calculation shown below
illustrates how an investment in a 200 unit subdivision can only entail a $4 million equity
38Issues raised during interview with Ron Myhro, Capital Advisors, San Diego, CA
infusion. Each project necessarily has to be treated as a separate investment, evaluated,
and managed as such. The logical method to approach this sort of investment is through
an investment advisor. Because of the unique nature of housing development and the
degree of discretion that is required, it is important that the manager have a well
developed knowledge of how to build houses and otherwise run a manufacturing
operation. This is not a question of managing cash flows from an income producing office
building. In order for the sponsor to stay abreast of the investment, a uniform set of
documentation can be developed and applied to each project. Because of the phased
nature of development, performance evaluations can be performed before subsequent
funds are risked. The phasing of projects and the incremental nature of the investment
also give the sponsor an ability to withdraw funds from the advisor if performance is not
satisfactory. This last point also raises another issue; that of liquidity. Funds typically are
interested in real estate as a long term investment. The self-liquidating nature of for-sale
housing is anything but long term.
Assumptions: 200 lot subdivision
Up front land acquisition
20 homes under construction at a given time
Land Price $50,000 per unit x 200 = $10 m
Const. cost $150,000 per unit x20 = $3
Maximum outstanding $13 m
30% gap equity $3.9 m
While the home-building process is a short term endeavor, in fact delays can greatly
reduce the profitability of a project, investment in home building can be a long-term
undertaking. Some investments, such as in the infrastructure of a master planned
community, can still be generating returns twenty or thirty years later. If pension funds
wanted to invest in a long-term master planned community, it would be much simpler and
less risky for them to invest in a Mello-Roos bond or similar instrument. The concern here
is their ability to manage the short-term nature of the housing construction process. This
can be accomplished by structuring an investment program that rolls over. When returns
of capital are realized, they can be reinvested in the next project. At the same time,
interest on that capital can be paid to the sponsor to provide yearly cash flows. Since
investments are most likely going to provide for the equity gap capital that lenders are
requiring, the first year or two of an investment program may not generate returns as the
senior construction debt is paid down. Liquidity becomes an issue as the first projects
mature. Because of the use of advisors to manage these investments, sponsors can
structure the deal to act like a closed-end fund. After three, five, or ten years the fund can
be liquidated and the initial capital investment paid back. The self-liquidating nature of the
individual projects can then act as security for the sponsor, allowing for the withdrawal of
dollars from the account if performance is not as anticipated.
A third issue involves the questions of unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) and the
re-characterization of an investment in home building as a dealer in real estate.
UBTI arises if the tax-exempt organization is an owner of an interest
in real estate which is subject to a mortgage placed on the real estate
in order to finance all or part of the owner's acquisition cost.....(A
mortgage fitting this description is referred to as "acquisition
indebtedness"...)
If a tax exempt entity tries to increase its yield by leveraging its
position through providing a subordinate participating mortgage, it
runs the risk of UBTI, if that mortgage is characterized as equity. 39
39Real Estate Finance and Taxation : Structuring Complex Transactions, Robert L. Nessen, Esq. , Wiley
Law Publications, 1990 § 5.83 pg. 90
A pension fund can avoid UBTI, even if it is investing equity capital,
provided that the mortgage meets the conditions stated in I.R.C. §
514 (c) (9).40
According to I.R.C. § 514 (c) (9),
acquisition indebtedness [which can include debt for improvements]
does not include.. .indebtedness incurred by a qualified organization
[such as a tax-exempt pension fund] in acquiring or improving any
real property.
It thus appears that pension funds are not subject to UBTI through the use of leverage to
finance home building. There is a separate characteristic of an investment in home
building that is a bit more cloudy. An entity that is involved in the construction of for-sale
housing, and derives profits from the sale of inventory, is considered a dealer in real estate,
and as such generates active income which is taxable as ordinary income. 41 This problem
becomes more acute for private pension funds that are not tax-exempt and a) want to
minimize tax liabilities, and b) have passive losses that could not be used to shelter active
income. The approach that appears suitable for addressing this issue is for the investment
to be characterized as straight debt or channeled through a limited partnership. Both of
these questions are ones that may have to be answered by the tax courts. CalPERS and
the advisor industry represented by those interviewed, feel confident that these issues have
been addressed adequately to allow for a successful investment. As will be shown,
complex partnership and investment vehicles have been devised to further insulate funds
from UBTI as well as other risks and liabilities.
40Ibid,§ 5.83 pg. 924 1 id § 4.41 pg. 75
The CalPERS Program42
This past January the first investment program of its type has been created by The
California Public Employees Retirement System. CalPERS has decided to allocate $375
million to invest in the construction and development of homes throughout California.
The impetus for this investment is two-fold. First, CalPERS realized that there was an
opportunity to invest in home building left by the contraction of traditional lending
sources, and that the expected level of returns were commensurate with the given level of
risk. Second, there was some political pressure placed on the fund to use its vast
resources to help California pull itself out of the recession it was falling into. It was
estimated that these funds might eventually lead to the construction of 7500 homes
throughout the state. While politics may have been a motivating factor, the fiduciary.
responsibility of the fund sponsor is assurance that the investment is being undertaken on
its economic merits.
Because of the fractionalized nature of home building, as previously discussed, advisors
are being utilized to invest the funds on a discretionary basis subject to some basic
guidelines set down by CaIPERS. Trying to manage each investment individually would
be an overwhelming task for CalPERS. The substantial home building and financing
expertise represented by the advisors is a welcomed and desired attribute for the plan
sponsors. The advisor groups also act to insulate CalPERS from liability and litigation
which may arise from being involved in a consumer product investment. 43 In general,
CalPERS' investment is structured through a limited partnership and takes a passive role in
the management of the investment.
42Information in the following section has been compiled from a series of interviews with the five
advisors mentioned and CalPERS. Individual interviewees are noted in the appendix.
4 3Comments from an interview with Doug Neff, AMB/O'Donnell Group
The investment has been split up between five advisors, each being allocated $75 million.
CalPERS has required that each advisor invest an additional 10%, or $7.5 million
(otherwise known as pay-attention money). CalPERS has allowed these advisors to raise
a portion of their shares from outside sources, but generally this is done only when the
principles of the advisor group have invested out of their own personal resources. This
personal involvement can be considered better collateral than if the funds came 100% from
corporate coffers.
The first step that CalPERS has taken to minimize its risk through diversification is to
make use of five separate advisors. The second level of diversification is through the use
of different investment vehicles. Two of the advisors, Wells Fargo Realty Advisors and
Alex Brown Kleinworth Benson / Bankers Trust (ABKB/BT), are using a participating
second mortgage. Prudential Home Building Investors (PHBI), AMB / ODonnell Group's
Institutional Housing Partners (IHP), and California Housing Advisors (CHA) are using
various forms of joint venture equity partnerships. The main thrust of the investment
program is to target the equity gap. As such, the investments will be subordinated to
senior construction financing. CaIPERS has allowed for senior construction debt, though
only CHA plans on utilizing this feature on a regular basis.
Projects will consist mainly of affordable, entry-level and first-time move-up housing,
though second time move-up will be considered. Project size will range in the 60 to 250
unit range, with the majority falling around 100 to 150 units. Land development will be
considered, but all entitlements must be in place and the cost of land development cannot
exceed 20% of the overall cost of the project. The time frame to complete the project
must be between one and four years. The initial investment period is scheduled to run 54
months with placement of funds in the first three years. No one particular builder will be
allowed to account for more than 20% of the investment.
Builders are being chosen for a long-term relationship. As Al Fernandez pointed out,
,there are economies of scale in maintaining relationships with builders." Therefor the
selection process is very focused. Builders being considered are those deemed first and
second tier builders. What this means is that builders must a) have a seasoned
mana ,.ment, b) be financially sound enough to attract third party construction financing,
with CalPERS designated only as a limited partner, c) be financially liquid to the extent
that they can cover any cost overruns in the budget, even if they have other projects under
way, d) have 5 to 10 years experience building that particular product type they are being
considered for, and e) be able to demonstrate the capacity to build the number of units
being proposed. An emphasis is being placed on the abilities of a builder to run a
manufacturing operation. Only when an advisor is confident in a builder's ability will a
project be considered on its economic merits. This point cannot be stressed enough.
Pension fund sponsors who have been involved only in commercial real estate should take
this point to heart.
The builders are required to invest a minimum 10% of a project's largest amount
outstanding at any one time with CalPERS/advisor investing 30% (split 90% CalPERS
and 10% advisor) and the balance in third party financing. The builder's contribution must
be made at initial funding and may take the form, in some instances, of letter of credit,
land, or even subordination of the builder's fee. The builder is to earn a management fee
of 3% of gross revenues and the advisor is to earn a commitment fee of 110 basis points
on the commitment, an annual asset management fee of 85 basis points of funds
44 Comments from an interview with Al Fernandez, CalPERS
outstanding, and a share of the profits which increases as the internal rate of return
increases to CalPERS. The builder's fee is payable partially during the construction
period, with the balance coming as homes are settled. The CalPERS/advisor investment is
to earn a preferred return of prime plus 3%, capped at 13%, payable at the end of each
phase. The builder will then receive a similar return on its equity, with the balance of the
pro-forma profits split 50/50 (CalPERS receives its 50% percent on a priority basis,
subjecting the builder's 50% to cost overruns first). The actual degree to which the profits
are split varies with the quality of the builder's equity. A 10% cash infusion generally
would result in a 50/50 split. Any additional profits over pro-forma are usually split at the
same rate, with the advisor sharing in CalPERS' percentage as mentioned above.
CalPERS is expecting to earn returns in the 15% to 20% range. Their target is to earn
real returns of 8%, well above the 6.6% expected on overall real estate investments.
Senior construction financing, if it is provided, will run at prime plus 200 basis points.
CalPERS has set up an account for each advisor from which they draw down their $75
million allocations as projects are brought on-line. The intent of the program is to place
the funds within the first three years. Any returns of equity, interest or profit are put back
into the accounts for reallocation. CalPERS has the option of pulling cash returns out of
the program. After three years, no new projects are funded and the balance is paid down
as each project is completed.
The investment vehicles that are being utilized vary in complexity. For Prudential, the
investment is structured as a limited partnership. Prudential forms a limited partnership
with Prudential Insurance Company of America as the general partner and CalPERS as a
limited partner. This L.P. then enters a second L.P. with the builder where the builder is
the general partner and the Prudential L.P. is an L.P. Prudential also has commitments
from other pension investors, where these funds invest in an insurance company separate
account. The separate account then invests as an L.P. with Prudential as the G.P. As with
the CalPERS program, this L.P. then forms a second L.P. with the builder, the builder
acting as the G.P. One of the benefits of such a vehicle is that the insurance company
separate account can be commingled, thus allowing for other investors, or it can be a
single investor account. The insurance company separate account also serves to further
insulate the pension fund investors from UBTI, consumer product litigation, and other
liabilities. Institutional Housing Partners is also utilizing a limited partnership approach,
whereby IHP and CalPERS are limited partners and the builder is the general partner.
California Housing Advisors have taken a little bit different approach. They have created
a limited partnership in which CHA is the general partner, CalPERS is a limited partner,
and the builder is a limited partner. This partnership then enters into a development
agreement with the builder to manage the project. The general partner reserves the right
to unilaterally terminate the development agreement (i.e. replace the builder), but the
builder still retains its interest in the partnership. CHA has taken the added precaution of
staffing itself with people highly qualified in the construction / development field in case
they find themselves building out a project. Their approach is to maintain complete
control of the project. As a means to this end they finance the entire project, including
non-recourse construction financing and bonding requirements. CHA also maintains
control over project accounting and bill paying. In return for submitting to such control,
the builder is only required to put up 4% of the project cost as equity. As is common with
the other advisors, the builder is required to submit a project pro-forma, schedule, project
plan, budget and market study. As Richard Werner, president of CHA put it, the builder
must submit to the "Hearthstone Proctology Exam" (Hearthstone is the managing partner
of CHA).45
45Comments from the Builders Financing Forum, San Francisco, Ca., May 22, 1992
An alternative investment structure to an equity joint venture is a participating secondary
mortgage. This structure may present a more conservative approach. ABKB/BT is
utilizing this structure for their investments. They have formed a limited partnership
named Residential Real Estate Partners (RREP) with CalPERS as an L.P. and Alex Brown
and Bankers Trust as co-general partners. RREP then invests in projects through a
participatory mortgage, usually earning a coupon of prime plus 3% with contingent
interest of 50% of the project's profits. This mortgage instrument is subordinated to the
senior construction financing. Winston Hickox feels that this structure provides
protections and features not available from equity joint ventures. Because this investment
is structured as debt and not equity it is felt that the pension fund will be further insulated
from UBTI. While this may not seem as important to a public fund such as CalPERS, it
should be of comfort to private and non-tax-exempt funds. Hickox also feels that it is
better to be in a lender's position if the project goes into default. The builder's equity will
be put at risk first, and it may be simpler for the partnership to extricate itself from any
legal proceedings." Wells Fargo Realty Advisors is also utilizing a participatory mortgage
structure very similar to this one.
The CalPERS program has gone a long way to show how an investment in home building
can be structured. It has been shaped to address the issues of management, liquidity, and
income tax. It presents an investment opportunity that can be structured either as a
separate account or a commingled fund that could potentially be open-ended. Cash flows
are flexible, permitting either reinvestment or taking of returns. The investment is
diversified in a multitude of directions and is well monitored and controlled. Participation
can be increased or decreased with market conditions. Though such an investment moves
46Comments from an interview with Winston Hickox, ABKB/BT
away from real estate as an inflation hedge towards real estate as a manufacturing process,
it is still an investment in real estate and as such retains the negative correlation with the
stock market.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The decline in real estate values, the failure of the nation's savings and loan industry and
institutional regulatory reforms initiated by FIRREA have teamed up to drastically reduce
capital availability to the home building industry. All of the traditional sources of capital
have been affected by these conditions. Commercial banks, which are widely expected to
fill the void left by the savings and loans, have so far refused or have been unable to do so.
What capital is available from banks is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain.
In the meantime, demand for housing has stabilized after falling from its peak in 1989.
Building activity is also on the rebound, as excess inventories are being reduced to satisfy
demand. Land values are declining, thus heightening potential for new demand. As
excess supply is depleted there will be increasing need for new sources of capital to step
into the market to replace the savings and loans. Even if commercial banks do return to
pick up the slack, regulatory requirements and bruised egos are going to create
opportunities for equity gap financing. By entering the market now, alternative sources of
capital can carve out their niche and develop their programs so they are ready when the
competition returns.
The greatest opportunities are going to be available in providing financing for the mid-
sized builders. This group of builders is slowly being driven out of business or into the
arms of the larger, well capitalized builders. The two main sources that appear able to
channel capital into the industry are Wall Street and the pension funds. Wall Street is still
enamored over higher risk, higher return deals and do not see home building as that
tantalizing, though they do recognize that opportunities exist. Sooner or later a retail
instrument will be created whereby Wall Street's resources can be tapped. Sooner or later
will not ease the credit crunch today. The opportunity is now and the pension fund is the
most likely player to fill in the gap.
Pension funds have the capital, they need to place it, and they are still looking at real
estate. Commercial real estate opportunities are opening up, but unless acquisitions can
be made well under current market values, returns are predicted to be below those
available with housing. Now that investors have realized that commercial real estate can
indeed depreciate in value, they should be insisting on even higher returns than before as
the realized risk has grown substantially. Housing is a serious alternative investment and
one that be structured to mitigate much of the risk associated with real estate.
Housing offers diversification; both within a real estate portfolio and within itself
Investment can be spread out geographically amongst regional markets. Investment can
be diversified by product type, builder, and investment vehicle. Housing investment can
also span a range of risk and return. Such an investment is flexible; it can be enlarged or
contracted; it can reinvest cash flows or disperse them. Investment can also be shifted
with the market, whether the market expands or contracts, or shifts from the West Coast
to the Mid-west.
Housing investment is also highly manageable. It can be structured, and is well suited, as
a hands-off investment for pension sponsors. Reinvestment and self-liquidation is no more
a problem for housing investment than it is for stocks and bonds. Housing also generates
a respectable return, with a relatively low volatility. And, being an investment in real
estate, housing still provides a negative correlation of returns with traditional pension fund
assets of stocks and bonds.
The CalPERS program has demonstrated that pension fund investment in housing is a
manageable, legitimate investment that can be structured to meet a sponsor's fiduciary
responsibilities to the plan's beneficiaries. The returns that CalPERS is expecting are
resoectable and the risks are controllable. CalPERS has broken the ice by creating a
program that responds to the many issues raised regarding pension fund investment in
housing construction. The opportunities for investing in housing are abundant enough for
investors to get in and establish their own program, thus ensuring a long-term relationship
with industry players for when, and if, the traditional sources return. The biggest obstacle
for pension funds, or any other potential investor, is lack of familiarity with the housing
industry as an investment opportunity. As housing becomes a better understood animal,
pension fund activity should continue to pick up.
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